WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 (UPI) -- As the United States attempts to identify a new strategy for Iraq, perhaps the following might be helpful to the realists:
-- Don't Disengage Prematurely. The United States needs to start thinking like insurgents, adopting the long view.
-- Look at the map. Iraq is a geographic wedge blocking the regional aspirations of Iran and Syria. Their model for Iraq is Lebanon, to divide Iraq into spheres of influence, not unlike the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939.
If the United States leaves, Iran and Syria will fill the vacuum and control a continuous landmass from the Afghan border in the east to Lebanon 's Mediterranean coast in the west. They will own Iraq 's oil reserves.
Afghanistan will be the next target, caught between Iran and the Taliban and al-Qaida stronghold of Waziristan, Pakistan's rogue western province. The fragile states of the Arabian Peninsula will be sandwiched between Iran and Syria's area of control and the soon-to-be radicalized Horn of Africa with Somalia as the first domino.
-- The fundamental principle of insurgency is for the United States and the West not to "lose" -- i.e. surrender as a short-term expedient. This means clearing and holding centers of gravity such as Baghdad and its surroundings, securing the oil fields and making the northern Kurdish region Iraq's case study in successful stability operations.
-- Do the unexpected. Instead of reacting to events and the agenda of others, take the initiative.
--Make it the declared policy of the United States to assist the Iranian people to free themselves from their oppressive government and take actions to facilitate the opposition and destabilize the theocracy.
-- Put Syria on the defensive in Lebanon by supporting an international tribunal on the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, funneling support to anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon and applying economic pressure.
-- Part of U.S. efforts should be to create an insurgent problem for Iran and Syria, tasks tailor-made for covert and special operations.
-- Increase troop levels in Iraq. If necessary to fill the gaps use temporary measures, such as special 18-month military volunteers with 6-months training and 12-month deployments to less volatile locations.
-- Seal Iraq's borders. Insist that the rich Arab states help pay to stabilize Iraq, not simply arm the Sunnis. A successful Iraq will act as a buffer against Iranian expansionism and insurrection in their own countries.
-- Don't get involved in sectarian violence. Unless there is an increase in boots on the ground, there is little the United States can do to stem the Shiite-Sunni cycle of violence.
The policy should be isolation and containment and, wherever possible, securing islands of stability by working with selected local tribal leaders and investing locally, i.e. bottom-up nation building. When timely and actionable intelligence is available, U.S. military forces can hunt militia or insurgent elements, especially when they expose themselves. The bulk of the effort to stem sectarian violence must remain with the Iraqis themselves. This is largely an internal Iraqi political power struggle.
-- Don't negotiate from weakness. One cannot win at the negotiating table what one has lost on the battlefield. The perception of a U.S. defeat in Iraq permeates and poisons the present diplomatic atmosphere. Compromise cannot be expected when dealing with international thugs, which is not unlike dealing with street bullies.
Diplomatic toughness and a little "street smarts" can go a long way. Statesmen often confuse international relations with interpersonal relations. Franklin D. Roosevelt made that mistake with Joseph Stalin.
Similar to personal relationships, it is understandable that citizens of a nation might want to be liked. There is a lot of talk in the United States today about having lost the moral high ground. International thugs seldom consider this an important factor in controlling their behavior. It is better that the United States be respected, and, if that is not possible, fear will do.
-- Rally and engage the American people. No strategy survives an absence of political will. Much of the present discontent in the United States over the Iraq war is not over its goals, but the perceived half-hearted and incompetent manner in which it has been conducted. That notion is reflected in the comment "win or get out."
The American people are capable of much sacrifice, yet the only ones who have sacrificed so far have been the military and their families. For the rest of the country, it's been more or less business as usual, the war rarely intruding in our daily lives. The government has done a relatively poor job of rallying the people.
-- American leaders need to come to grips with the concepts of initiative, pursuit of a defeated force and the psychology of losing. Before any political measures can be successful, we must clearly, in the eyes of the world, regain the military initiative.
Leaders in Washington need to understand that if both our enemies and friends perceive that the United States is defeated, no amount of diplomacy will improve our position. It will be open season on Americans and American interests at home and abroad. That is, the United States will be pursued. Every jihadi wannabe, who can get a hand grenade will be visiting our shopping malls.
If you prefer realism, try the Marine Corps adage: nobody likes to fight, but somebody better know how.
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(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D. is an Afghanistan veteran)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
