WASHINGTON, April 20 (UPI) -- A leading expert on Iraq says the U.S. government must recognize, admit and learn from its mistakes if it is to win the "long war" on terrorism.
Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes in "American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in Iraq: A Litany of Errors," that the main mistake was placing too much credence "in ideologues and true believers" and not paying enough attention to what would happen after Saddam Hussein fell from power.
"The problem was the most senior political and military decision makers ignored what they felt was negative advice. They did so out of a combination of sincere belief, ideological conviction and political and bureaucratic convenience," Cordesman writes.
His report comes as six former generals have criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for ignoring military advice and intimidating underlings.
Cordesman is less interested in assigning blame than in diagnosing what went wrong, and how to fix it. His diagnosis, however, points the finger of responsibility at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House's National Security Council.
"The Office of the Secretary of Defense put intense pressure on the military to plan for the smallest possible military deployment," Cordesman writes.
"Many of the key decisions involved were made in ways that bypassed the interagency process within the U.S. government, ignored the warnings of U.S. area and intelligence experts, ignored prior military war and stability planning by the U.S. Central Command and ignored the warnings of policy makers and experts in other key coalition states like the United Kingdom."
He also highlights failures of the military.
"At the same time, the leadership of the U.S. military actively resisted planning for, and involvement in, large scale and enduring stability and nation-building, and failed to plan and deploy for the risk of a significant insurgency."
